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NEPA’s Zone of Interests 
Kenley S. Maddux∗ 
The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) is a central 
federal environmental conservation statute.1 It requires federal 
agencies to consider the environmental impacts of their actions and to 
incorporate environmental values into their decisionmaking.2 Private 
parties injured by agency noncompliance with NEPA may be able to 
sue in federal court for an injunction mandating NEPA compliance.3 
Common harms in the reported NEPA cases include damage to 
property,4 recreational opportunities,5 and aesthetic values.6  
 
 ∗ J.D. (2007), Washington University School of Law; B.A. (2003), The Ohio State 
University. The author thanks all who helped him directly and indirectly to bring this Article 
into being, particularly his family, the Honorable Rodney W. Sippel, Neil M. Richards, Ann 
Davis Shields, and the Journal of Law & Policy. 
 1.  National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–47 (2000). NEPA has 
been called “the magna carta” of environmental legislation. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA 
LAW AND LITIGATION, § 1.1 (2d ed. 2006). 
 2. See infra Part I.A for a discussion of NEPA’s mandatory procedures. NEPA’s most 
significant provision, the environmental impact statement (“EIS”) requirement, applies only to 
federal actions with significant environmental impacts. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000). However, the 
threshold issue of whether the EIS requirement applies requires agencies to consider and weigh 
the environmental impacts of their actions. See infra Part I.A (discussing the NEPA process). 
NEPA’s purpose is arguably served even when an agency chooses to avoid it by pursuing an 
alternative with a low environmental impact.  
 3.  See infra Part I.B for a discussion of NEPA suits and remedies. 
 4.  See, e.g., Knaust v. City of Kingston, 978 F. Supp. 86, 90 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(discussing the effect of polluted runoff on property) vacated by 157 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1998). 
Knaust is discussed infra at note 44.  
 5.  See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 
U.S. 669, 678, 686–88 (1973) (discussing the inability to use wildlife areas for “camping, 
hiking, fishing, sightseeing, and other recreational [and] aesthetic purposes”). 
 6.  Id.; see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (“[a]esthetic and 
environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of 
life in our society, and the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many 
rather than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial 
process”). 
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Before a private party can sue to enforce NEPA, the party must 
establish its standing.7 The standing of private parties to bring actions 
under NEPA is the focus of this Note.8 Specifically, this Note focuses 
on the zone of interests test for prudential standing.9 This judicially 
created requirement bars plaintiffs asserting injuries outside the zone 
of interests of the statutory provision on which they rely.10  
A circuit split has formed regarding the application of the zone of 
interests test to NEPA.11 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently 
held that purely economic interests are not within the zone of 
 
 7.  See infra Part I.C for a general discussion of standing in NEPA cases. It may be worth 
noting here that modern standing doctrine has been attacked by scholars calling for its reform or 
demise. See generally Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 670–83 
(2004) (describing normative critiques of standing jurisprudence advanced by various scholars); 
see also infra note 48 (presenting critiques of modern standing jurisprudence based on 
precedent). Some scholars argue that the current standing requirements misinterpret the 
Constitution. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” 
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 166–67 (1992) (calling the injury in fact requirement “a 
misinterpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act and Article III”). Others criticize a 
perceived flexibility in the doctrine which allows judges to insert personal ideology into the 
process. E.g., Richard J. Pierce, Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1744 
(1999) (arguing that modern standing law is characterized by a “high degree of doctrinal 
malleability and result-oriented doctrinal manipulation” by judges). This debate is beyond the 
scope of this Note.  
 8.  This Note addresses standing to bring suit only. Standing of private parties to 
intervene in NEPA suits is closely related, but the issues are not identical. See generally Juliet 
Johnson Karastelev, Note, On the Outside Seeking In: Must Intervenors Demonstrate Standing 
to Join a Lawsuit?, 52 DUKE L.J. 455 (2002) (describing law of intervenor standing and arguing 
that standing should apply to intervenors only when they assert or defend a legal claim). One 
point of difference is that Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be a bar to 
intervenors, but not to plaintiffs. FED. R. CIV. P. 24. While the analysis and conclusions of this 
Note may in some respects apply to standing to intervene, this Note does not attempt to identify 
the extent to which such is the case. See Erik Figlio, Note, Stacking the Deck Against “Purely 
Economic Interests”: Inequity and Intervention in Environmental Litigation, 35 GA. L. REV. 
1219 (2001), for one perspective on intervenor standing in NEPA cases.  
 9. See infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text for a discussion of prudential standing. 
Note that standing is subject to constitutional limitations as well as prudential ones. Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Constitutional standing is the set of features 
essential to a “case or controversy” within the meaning of Article III. See id. at 559–62; U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2. The various constitutional requirements present their own obstacles to 
would-be plaintiffs. See generally Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559–62; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 2.5 (2d ed. 1997). These requirements are 
beyond the scope of this Note.  
 10.  See infra notes 51–62 and accompanying text for discussion of the zone of interests 
test. 
 11. See infra Part II for coverage of the circuit split.  
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interests of any provision of NEPA.12 That decision criticized a line 
of Eighth Circuit cases,13 which held that at least one of NEPA’s 
provisions may protect purely economic interests.14 In effect, the 
Ninth Circuit rule prevents individuals suffering economic harms due 
to agency noncompliance with NEPA from challenging the 
detrimental agency actions in court.15 The Eighth Circuit rule, on the 
other hand, appears to permit challenges based on economic injuries 
in some circumstances.16  
This Note analyzes the split and attempts to identify an 
appropriate resolution. Part I outlines NEPA and current standing 
jurisprudence. Part II presents the division of authority on NEPA’s 
zone of interests and sets out the arguments of each side. Part III 
evaluates the competing approaches, looking at whether each is 
consistent with legislative intent, judicial precedent, and public 
policy.  
 
 12.  Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934, 944–45 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Thus, 
to the extent [EIS] regulations clarify section 102(2)(c)’s zone of interests, they demonstrate 
that purely economic interests are not in that zone.”). See infra Part II.B for a discussion of 
Ashley Creek.  
 13.  Ashley Creek, 420 F.3d at 942 (noting “disagreement with the Eighth Circuit’s 
reasoning” and criticizing the Eighth Circuit’s “open-ended and expansive” view of NEPA).  
 14.  See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. McDivitt, 286 F.3d 1031, 1038 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Even 
purely economic interests may confer standing under NEPA if the particular NEPA provision 
giving rise to plaintiff’s suit evinces a concern for economic considerations.”). See infra Part 
II.A for discussion of the Eighth Circuit rule on NEPA’s zone of interests.  
 15. Ashley Creek’s discussion of prudential standing is merely an alternative basis for 
decision; the primary basis for the decision is constitutional standing. Ashley Creek, 420 F.3d at 
939; see also id. at 945 (Beezer, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part) (“Because [plaintiff] has 
failed to establish constitutional standing, I would leave [the prudential standing issue] for 
another day.”).  
 16. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit allows NEPA challenges on economic grounds when 
the agency has prepared an environmental impact statement. See Rosebud, 286 F.3d at 1038; 
infra Part II.A (discussing the Eighth Circuit position). 
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I. BACKGROUND: NEPA, NEPA ACTIONS, AND STANDING TO SUE 
UNDER NEPA 
A. NEPA’s Environmental Impact Statement Requirement17 
NEPA is primarily a procedural statute.18 The legislative purpose 
stated in NEPA is to promote environmental values.19 NEPA 
promotes environmental interests most actively with its 
environmental impact statement (“EIS”) requirement.20 An EIS is a 
statement of the various impacts of a given action.21 The Council on 
Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) has the power to issue regulations 
 
 17. The sketch of NEPA in this section serves the narrow purposes of this Note. For a 
thorough treatment of NEPA, see MANDELKER, supra note 1.  
 18. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 
U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (“[NEPA’s] mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural.”). The view 
that NEPA is procedural rather than substantive, although uniformly accepted by the courts, has 
been condemned by some scholars. See, e.g., Philip Weinberg, It’s Time To Put NEPA Back on 
Course, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 99 (1994). 
 19. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2000). NEPA 
states its purpose:  
. . . to declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable 
harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or 
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and 
welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural 
resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental 
Quality.  
Id.  
20. Id. § 102(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2005). NEPA requires federal agencies to: 
. . . include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other 
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a 
detailed statement by the responsible official on-- 
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be 
implemented,  
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be 
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
Id.  
 21. See id.; MANDELKER, supra note 1, § 2.6.  
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interpreting the EIS requirement.22 An EIS or substantial equivalent 
is required whenever the action will cause a significant 
environmental impact.23 CEQ regulations impose numerous 
procedural and drafting requirements on the preparation of an EIS,24 
which can make the process complex and protracted.25 Preparation of 
 
 22. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500–18 (2005). NEPA gives the CEQ various information gathering 
and reporting duties, neap § 9, 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (2000), but does not authorize it to promulgate 
regulations. Regulatory authority over NEPA was granted by executive order. Exec. Order No. 
11,514, 3 C.F.R. § 902 (1969–1970), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994). 
Another executive order made the CEQ regulations interpreting NEPA binding on government 
agencies. Exec. Order No. 11,991, 3 C.F.R. § 123 (1977), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994). 
Courts defer to the CEQ regulations interpreting NEPA. See, e.g., Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 
U.S. 347, 358 (1979) (“CEQ’s interpretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial deference.”). 
 23. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000).  
 24. See generally MANDELKER, supra note 1, §§ 7:11–:17; Valentine D. Sworts and Alan 
C. Schroeder, Pegasus, Workhorse, or Trojan Horse? A Case Study of the Use of the NEPA 
Process in Grazing Use Decisions on Bureau of Land Management Lands in Wyoming, 3 WYO. 
L. REV. 3, 21–23 (2003).  
 25. First, an agency must publish a notice of intent to prepare an EIS in the Federal 
Register. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2005). The notice must describe the proposed action, possible 
alternatives to the action, and the agency’s EIS scoping process. Id. § 1508.22.  
 Next, the preparing agency must perform a scoping process, creating a list of all 
environmental issues relevant to the project under consideration. Id. § 1501.7. The agency must 
include interested private parties and federal and state agencies with relevant expertise in the 
scoping process. Id. The scoping report must include division of responsibilities among 
participating agencies and a timetable for completion of the EIS. Id.  
 The agency must then conduct the necessary research on the issues identified in the scoping 
report. Methods vary widely depending on the project, circumstances, and agency. See 
generally MANDELKER, supra note 1, § 10:2. 
 Next, the agency must prepare and release a draft EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9 (2005). The 
draft must conform as nearly as possible to the requirements of a final EIS. See id. §§ 1502.10–
.18 (format and content requirements); §§ 1502.21–.25 (analysis and use of evidence); 
§§ 1502.7, 1502.8, 1502.20 (stylistic norms). While regulations state that an EIS should 
normally be less than 150 pages and up to 300 in exceptional cases, id. § 1502.7, the average 
EIS released in the year 2000 was over 700 pages long. TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING NATIONAL 
ENVTL. POLICY ACT AND TASK FORCE ON UPDATING NATIONAL ENVTL. POLICY ACT, 109TH 
CONG., INITIAL FINDINGS AND DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS 18 (2005) [hereinafter TASK FORCE 
FINDINGS], available at http://environment.transportation.org/pdf/hot_documents/nepareport_ 
finaldraft.pdf. 
 A mandatory comment period follows the release of the draft, during which the preparing 
agency must submit the draft for Environmental Protection Agency review and accept 
comments from the public. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1503.1, 1506.10 (2005).  
 Finally, the agency must publish a record of decision (hereinafter “ROD”) regarding the 
EIS. Id. § 1505.2. The ROD must state the decision; identify all alternatives considered by the 
agency in reaching its decision; evaluate the various options, identifying all relevant factors and 
explaining how they affected the decision; identify, evaluate, and discuss all practicable means 
to mitigate environmental harm from the decision; adopt a monitoring and enforcement 
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an EIS can consume considerable agency resources and lead to costly 
project delays.26 As a result, agencies seem to avoid the EIS process 
whenever possible.27  
If an EIS were required for every federal agency action, NEPA 
would severely hamper the functions of the federal government. 
However, NEPA only requires an EIS where significant 
environmental impact is expected to result.28 For minor or routine 
actions, the agency will know the expected level of impact and 
whether an EIS is necessary without making any investigation.29 If 
the level of environmental impact is unknown, however, the agency 
must carry out an environmental assessment (“EA”).30 An EA 
addresses the sole question of whether any significant environmental 
impact from a given action is likely.31 Unlike an EIS, an EA is a brief 
report with few formal requirements.32  
If the EA shows that significant environmental impact may result 
from the action, the agency must complete an EIS.33 If not, the 
agency may release a finding of no significant impact (a “FONSI”).34 
A FONSI is the substantial equivalent of an EIS, therefore releasing a 
FONSI fulfills the EIS requirement.35 Like an EA but unlike an EIS, 
 
program for mitigation efforts where appropriate; and reply in an appropriate way to each 
comment received. Id.  
 This overview of the EIS process is drawn in part from Sworts, supra note 24, at 21–23. 
 26. For a discussion of the costs of EIS preparation, see TASK FORCE FINDINGS, supra 
note 25, at 21. 
 27. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVTL. POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF 
ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 19–20 (1997), available at http://ceq.eh.doe. 
gov/neap/nepa25fn.pdf [hereinafter CEQ STUDY] (noting a decrease in the number of EIS’s 
prepared annually).  
 28. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) 
(2000); 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2005).  
 29. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) (2005). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. § 1501.3. 
 32. Regulations define an environmental assessment as “a concise public document” 
which serves to “[b]riefly provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to 
prepare an environmental impact statement or a finding of no significant impact.” Id. § 1508.9. 
An EA must “include brief discussions of the need for the proposal, of alternatives [to the 
proposed action] . . . , [and] of the environmental impacts of the proposed action and 
alternatives, [as well as] a listing of agencies and persons consulted.” Id.  
 33. Id. §§ 1501.4(c), 1508.18, 1508.27. 
 34. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e) (2005). 
 35.  Id. § 1501.4. Agencies may also avoid the EIS requirement by creating categorical 
exclusions through rulemaking. Id. § 1508.4. A categorical exclusion is “a category of actions 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/10
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a FONSI has relatively few formal requirements.36 The FONSI 
complies with NEPA, and is cheaper and easier to prepare than an 
EIS.37 Not surprisingly, agencies frequently use FONSIs and other 
alternatives to the EIS process.38  
B. Private Actions to Enforce NEPA Compliance 
NEPA does not create a private cause of action.39 Unlike some 
environmental statutes, it has no citizen suit provision.40 However, 
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) allows individuals 
harmed by agency actions to seek judicial review of those actions.41 
As applied, the APA permits private parties to challenge agency 
compliance with NEPA in court.42 Courts review agency NEPA 
compliance efforts for arbitrariness and abuse of discretion.43 In these 
 
which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment 
. . . and for which, therefore, neither an environmental assessment nor an environmental impact 
statement is required.” Id.; see also id. § 1501.4. Categorical exclusions may generate 
controversy, see, e.g., Kevin H. Moriarty, Circumventing the National Environmental Policy 
Act: Agency Abuse of the Categorical Exclusion, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2312 (2004), and become 
targets of litigation, see High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Powell, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1042–44 
(N.D. Cal. 2001). Further examination of categorical exclusions and other EIS alternatives is 
beyond the scope of this Note.  
 36.  Compare 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (2005) (FONSI requirements), with supra note 32 
(discussing the EA requirements in 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3 (2005)) and supra note 25 (EIS 
requirements). 
 37.  See CEQ STUDY, supra note 27, at 20 (“When the EIS process is viewed as merely a 
compliance requirement rather than a tool to improve decisionmaking, mitigated FONSI’s may 
be used simply to prevent the expense and time of the more in-depth analysis required by an 
EIS.”). 
 38.  See id. at 19 (observing “a significant increase in EAs and a decrease in EISs”). Other 
alternatives to the EIS process exist and are used by agencies. See id. (mitigated FONSIs); 40 
C.F.R. § 1501.4(e) (categorical exclusions).  
   39. E.g., Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1238 (9th Cir. 
2005) (“NEPA do[es] not provide a private cause of action[.]”). 
 40. See, e.g., the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000). A House of 
Representatives task force has recommended that a citizen suit provision be added to NEPA. 
TASK FORCE FINDINGS, supra note 25, at 26–27.  
 41. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000). “A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or 
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is 
entitled to judicial review thereof.” Id.  
 42. See, e.g., Native Ecosystems, 428 F.3d at 1238 (“Decisions allegedly violating . . . 
NEPA are reviewed under the Administrative Procedure Act.”).  
 43.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). The abuse of discretion standard and the arbitrary and 
capricious standard are very similar, if not equivalent. See Ronald M. Levin, Scope-of-Review 
Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 239, 292 (1986). 
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cases, courts give agencies which have obeyed NEPA procedures 
substantial latitude to interpret the relevant data, weigh competing 
values, and select a course of action.44 In contrast, agencies who fail 
to comply with NEPA, such as those who have failed to prepare a 
required EIS, have their decisions more rigorously reviewed.45 These 
agencies may be enjoined from proceeding with the action until they 
satisfy NEPA.46  
C. Prudential Standing to File a NEPA Complaint 
Plaintiff standing is frequently litigated in NEPA cases.47 “In 
essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to 
 
Further examination of these standards of review or detailed analysis of their application in 
NEPA cases is beyond the scope of this Note. For general treatment of these standards in 
administrative law, see CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE, 
§§ 10.4–.6 (2d ed. 1997). For an overview of their application in NEPA cases, see 
MANDELKER, supra note 1, §§ 3.1–.4.  
 44.  See, e.g., Knaust v. City of Kingston, 978 F. Supp. 86 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), vacated, 
Knaust v. City of Kingston, 157 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1998). In that case, neighbors of the site of a 
proposed business park complained that polluted runoff from the project would damage their 
property. Id. at 90. The court stated that its role was “simply to ensure that the relevant agency’s 
decisions are not arbitrary and capricious.” Id. at 91. The court considered the agency 
decisionmaking record and the affidavits submitted by plaintiffs’ experts. Id. at 91–93. The 
experts’ testimony contradicted the agency on several key points. Id. The court did not attempt 
to decide which account was correct, but simply found that the agency “adequately considered 
and disclosed the environmental effects of the business park.” Id. at 93. It held that the agency’s 
actions were not arbitrary or capricious, and granted the agency’s motion for summary 
judgment on the NEPA claims. Id.  
 45.  For example, in Ocean Advocates v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 402 F.3d 
846 (9th Cir. 2005), the Army Corps of Engineers (hereinafter “Corps”) granted permits for 
construction of a second pier at an oil refinery on the Alaskan coast. Id. at 856–57. The Corps 
issued a FONSI for the project, accepting the oil company’s statements that the new pier would 
not increase the likelihood of an oil spill at the site. Id. at 856. The plaintiffs challenged the 
decision under NEPA. Id. at 855. On the NEPA issue, the Ninth Circuit held that the agency 
had overlooked the obvious fact that the second pier would increase the refinery’s ability to 
handle tanker traffic. Id. at 865–67. This point had been raised by various concerned groups 
throughout the permit process. Id. at 855–57. Failure to account for the potential impact of 
additional traffic was fatal to the FONSI. Id. at 867. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for 
evidentiary hearings and consideration of remedies. Id. at 875.  
 46.  For detailed coverage of injunctive remedies in NEPA cases, see MANDELKER, supra 
note 1, §§ 4:53–62.  
 47.  One source indicates, plausibly, that plaintiff standing is “the most frequently litigated 
issue in the reported NEPA cases.” John A. Glenn, et al., eds., Annotation, General Principles 
Governing Standing to Maintain Action Challenging Omission or Adequacy of Environmental 
Impact Statement Required by § 102(2)(c) of National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 
U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(c)), 61 A.L.R. FED. 87 § 2 (1983).  
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have the court decide the merits of the dispute or the particular 
issues.”48 Prudential standing is a set of principles of judicial self-
restraint regarding the types of interests that courts will allow a party 
to assert.49 Congress has the power to alter or eliminate the judicially-
created prudential standing rules.50  
The zone of interests test is the current formulation of a doctrine 
that has long existed in standing jurisprudence.51 The test was first 
stated in Association Data Processing Service Organization v. 
Camp.52 In that case, the Supreme Court considered whether financial 
data processors had standing under the APA and relevant banking 
statutes to challenge a regulation allowing banks to participate in the 
data processing field.53 The plaintiffs’ naked purpose in opposing the 
regulation was to protect their business from competition.54 The 
Court stated the rule that a complainant has standing only if “the 
interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within 
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or 
constitutional guarantee in question.”55 Applying this rule, the Court 
 
 48.  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). See also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 
750–52 (1984) (summarizing standing doctrine); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1442 (8th ed. 
1999) (defining standing as “a party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement 
of a duty or right”). While use of the term “standing” to describe a discrete area of law is a 
relatively recent addition to constitutional jurisprudence, see KOCH, supra note 43, § 14.13, its 
originators claimed a foundation in earlier jurisprudence, see Ass’n of Data Processing Orgs. v. 
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151–57 (1970) (discussing precedent). Whether standing has an 
acceptable historical foundation continues to be a subject of debate among scholars. Compare 
Ann Woodhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 689, 691–92 (2004) (arguing that standing had ample precedent at the time of its 
emergence), with Sunstein, supra note 7, 166.  
 49.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 
U.S. 249, 255 (1953) (setting out the rule of self-restraint). In addition to limiting the zone of 
interests, prudential standing bars plaintiffs from asserting either the rights of third parties or 
“‘generalized grievance[s]’ shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of 
citizens.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).  
 50.  Warth, 422 U.S. at 501; Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208–10 
(1972) (stating that Congress may grant standing as broadly as Article III permits). Congress 
cannot alter standing requirements drawn from the Constitution. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501; see 
also supra note 9 (distinguishing constitutional standing from prudential standing).  
 51.  See Jonathan R. Siegel, Zone of Interests, 92 GEO. L.J. 317, 319–41 (2004).  
 52.  Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).  
 53.  Id. at 151.  
 54.  Id. If the banks were permitted to provide data processing services, the companies 
already in that business stood to lose customers and revenue. Id.  
 55.  Id. at 153.  
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held that the banking statute’s express limitation on certain bank 
activities “arguably brings a competitor within the zone of interests 
protected by it.”56 It concluded that the data processors had standing 
to seek judicial review.57  
The Data Processing zone of interests test remains a feature of 
prudential standing.58 It has been described as a permissive 
requirement.59 Competitor suits and suits by others asserting 
economic interests have been permitted under the APA in a variety of 
contexts.60 However, it is clear that the Court intends the requirement 
to bar at least some suits.61 Courts applying the zone of interests test 
have dismissed numerous suits.62 
The Supreme Court has not considered NEPA’s zone of interests 
test,63 but its decision in Bennett v. Spear presents a similar 
 
 56.  Id. at 156.  
 57.  Id. at 158.  
 58.  Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162–63 (1997).  
 59. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399–400 (1987) (noting that zone of 
interests test is permissive); id. at 400 n.15 (admonishing overly restrictive lower court 
interpretations). “The [zone of interests] test is not meant to be especially demanding; in 
particular, there need be no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be 
plaintiff.” Id. at 400 (footnote omitted). 
 60.  Id. at 394–400 (identifying cases illustrating the broad sweep of the zone of interests 
test).  
 61.  
[T]he failure of an agency to comply with a statutory provision requiring ‘on the 
record’ hearings would assuredly have an adverse effect upon the company that has the 
contract to record and transcribe the agency’s proceedings; but since the provision was 
obviously enacted to protect the interests of the parties to the proceedings and not 
those of the reporters, that company would not be adversely affected within the 
meaning of the statute.  
Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 504 U.S. 871, 883 (1990).  
 62.  In one such case, the Supreme Court held that postal employees who opposed a 
regulation permitting private couriers to engage in international remailing did not meet the zone 
of interests test. Air Courier Conference of America v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 
U.S. 517 (1991). The congressional purpose in enacting the statutes at issue “was not . . . 
opportunities for postal workers but . . . the receipt of necessary revenues for the Postal 
Service.” Id. at 525–26.  
 63. Lower courts have applied the Court’s statements about NEPA in Metro. Edison Co. 
v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983), to the zone of interests test even 
though standing was not an issue in that case. See Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness 
v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115, 1126 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Metro. Edison in discussion of 
NEPA’s zone of interests); Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass’n v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937, 938 
(9th Cir. 1985) (same); Morris v. Myers, 845 F. Supp. 750, 756–57 (D. Or. 1993) (same); 
Gerosa, Inc. v. Dole, 576 F. Supp. 344, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same). Metro. Edison arose in the 
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question.64 In Bennett, ranchers and farmers challenged a minimum 
water level set under the Endangered Species Act (hereinafter 
“ESA”),65 the purpose of which was to protect an endangered fish 
species living in a certain reservoir.66 The private plaintiffs alleged, 
among other claims, that the order violated section 7 of the ESA, 
which requires agencies to “use the best scientific and commercial 
data available” in making decisions under the ESA.67 The plaintiffs 
submitted data showing that the continued normal operation of the 
reservoir would not impact the fish species in question, and therefore 
the minimum water level was not necessary to protect the fish.68  
Standing was a central issue in the case.69 The plaintiffs’ interest 
in the matter was economic, namely their desire to use the reservoir 
water for agriculture.70 The Court stated that the zone of interests of a 
statute “is to be determined not by reference to the overall purpose of 
the Act in question . . . , but by reference to the particular provision 
 
wake of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident when a citizens’ group sued to 
force the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to consider the psychological effects on members of 
the community, specifically fear of a future disaster, in its decision to reopen the plant. Metro. 
Edison, 460 U.S. at 768–70. The EIS for the project considered the environmental effects of 
normal plant operation and the risks of environmental effects from future accidents. Id. at 775. 
In its discussion of the merits of the NEPA claim, the Court described the congressional 
purpose behind NEPA’s EIS requirement:  
To determine whether [§ 102(2)(C)] requires consideration of a particular effect, we 
must look at the relationship between that effect and the change in the physical 
environment caused by the major federal action at issue. . . . Our understanding of the 
congressional concerns that led to the enactment of NEPA suggests that the terms 
“environmental effect” and “environmental impact” in [§ 102(2)(C)] be read to include 
a requirement of a reasonably close causal relationship between a change in the 
physical environment and the effect at issue. 
Id. at 773–74. The Court held that fear of a future environmental event was insufficiently 
connected to the physical world to require consideration in an EIS. Id. at 779 (“NEPA does not 
require agencies to evaluate the effects of risk, qua risk.”).  
 64.  520 U.S. 154 (1997).  
 65.  Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2000). 
 66.  Bennett, 520 U.S. at 158–60.  
 67.  16 U.S.C. § 1536 (a)(2). The plaintiffs also sued under the ESA citizen suit 
provisions. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 160.  
 68.  Id.  
 69.  Id. at 174–78. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed the zone of interests test 
because their economic interest (using the water in the reservoir for agriculture) did not match 
the stated conservation purpose of the ESA. Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915, 919–22 (9th Cir. 
1995), rev’d, Bennett, 520 U.S. at 179. 
 70. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 160.  
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of law upon which the plaintiff relies.”71 The Court found that while 
the overall purpose of the ESA was species preservation, one purpose 
of section 7 was to prevent unnecessary impacts on the economy.72 It 
concluded that the plaintiffs were “plainly within the zone of interest 
that the provision protects.”73  
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER ‘ECONOMIC INTERESTS’ AND NEPA74 
A. The Eighth Circuit: Sometimes, NEPA Protects Purely Economic 
Interests 
The leading Eighth Circuit case on NEPA’s zone of interests is 
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. McDivitt.75 The appellant in Rosebud was a 
company that attempted to lease tribal land for hog production.76 
Initially, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) approved the lease 
 
 71.  Id. at 175–76. 
 72. The Court stated, 
The obvious purpose of the requirement that each agency “use the best scientific and 
commercial data available” is to ensure that the ESA not be implemented haphazardly, 
on the basis of speculation or surmise. While this no doubt serves to advance the 
ESA’s overall goal of species preservation, we think it readily apparent that another 
objective (if not indeed the primary one) is to avoid needless economic dislocation 
produced by agency officials zealously but unintelligently pursuing their 
environmental objectives.  
Id. at 176–77.  
 73.  Id. at 177. 
 74.  The circuit split has been most clearly expressed in the decisions of the Courts of 
Appeals of the Eighth and Ninth Circuit, so this Note focuses on those decisions. The District of 
Columbia Circuit has also considered the application of Bennett to the standing of economic 
interest plaintiffs under NEPA. Town of Stratford v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 285 F.3d 84, 88–89 
(D.C. Cir. 2002). The D.C. Circuit view seems closer to that of the Ninth Circuit. Compare id. 
with Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. McDivitt, 286 F.3d 1031, 1038 (8th Cir. 2002) (discussed infra at 
part II.A) and Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussed 
infra at part II.B).  
 75.  Rosebud Sioux, 286 F.3d 1031. Rosebud Sioux is the most recent Eighth Circuit case 
to address the issue and it summarizes, and synthesizes, the earlier precedent. See id. at 1038–
39 (discussing Cent. S.D. Coop. Grazing Dist. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 266 F.3d 
889, 892–96 (8th Cir. 2001); Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 
F.3d 1115, 1125–26 (8th Cir. 1999); Robinson v. Knebel, 550 F.2d 422, 425 (8th Cir. 1977)). 
 76. Id. at 1034–35. The initial action to challenge the revocation was brought by the lessor 
tribe. Id. at 1035. The lessee hog company intervened on the tribe’s side. Id. The tribe later 
withdrew after a change in leadership, and the hog company made the appeal. Id.  
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after preparing an EA and issuing a FONSI.77 The BIA later revoked 
its approval when an advocacy group challenged the lease in court, 
alleging noncompliance with NEPA.78 The hog company then 
challenged the revocation under NEPA.79 It did not rely on a specific 
NEPA provision to support its standing, but cited NEPA as a whole.80  
The Eighth Circuit recognizes that “the purpose of NEPA is to 
establish ‘a broad national commitment to protecting and promoting 
environmental quality.’”81 However, following Bennett,82 the court’s 
standing inquiry focuses on the particular provisions raised by the 
plaintiffs rather than the overarching purpose of the act in question.83 
The hog company’s failure to cite any specific provision led the court 
to summarize its previous analyses of standing under NEPA’s various 
provisions.84  
As read by the Eighth Circuit, use of the term “human 
environment” in NEPA’s EIS provision, section 102(2)(C),85 
“requires consideration of economic interests” in every EIS.86 In 
 
 77.  Id.  
 78. Concerned Rosebud Area Citizens v. Babbitt, 34 F. Supp. 2d. 775 (D.D.C. 1999); 
Rosebud Sioux, 286 F.3d at 1035.  
 79. Rosebud Sioux, 286 F.3d at 1035–36.  
 80. Id. at 1038 (“[Plaintiff] fails to cite in its complaint or other filings any particular 
provision of NEPA upon which it relies to protect its economic interests. Instead, it refers 
broadly to NEPA . . . .”).  
 81. Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115, 1125 (8th 
Cir. 1999) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348 (1989)).  
 82. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (discussed supra at text accompanying notes 
64–74). 
 83. See Rosebud Sioux, 286 F.3d at 1038 (citing Bennett, 520 U.S. at 175–76); Cent. S.D. 
Coop. Grazing Dist. v. Sec’y of the USDA, 266 F.3d 889, 895 (8th Cir. 2001) (same); 
Dombeck, 164 F.3d at 1125 (same)). 
 84. Rosebud Sioux, 286 F.3d at 1038.  
 85. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000) (requiring an EIS “in every recommendation or report 
on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of 
the human environment.”).  
 86. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. McDivitt, 286 F.3d 1031, 1038–39 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing 
Grazing, 266 F.3d at 896; Dombeck, 164 F.3d at 1125–27; Robinson v. Knebel, 550 F.2d 422, 
425 (8th Cir. 1977)). “[E]ven purely economic interests may confer standing under NEPA if the 
particular NEPA provision giving rise to the plaintiff’s suit evinces a concern for economic 
considerations. . . . [section 102(2)(C)] requires consideration of economic interests, [but] only 
applies when an EIS is prepared.” Id. at 1038–39.  
 Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 1999), 
was the first case from the Eighth Circuit to apparently allow economic interests to support 
standing in a NEPA suit. In Dombeck, a group of outfitters and guides who derived their 
livelihood from the use of a certain wilderness area challenged a Forest Service regulation 
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support of this interpretation, the Eighth Circuit cites the regulatory 
definition of “human environment,”87 and points out several other 
places where NEPA and its implementing regulations appear to 
display concern for economic interests.88 However, this aspect of 
section 102(2)(C) “only applies when an EIS is prepared,” and thus 
did not apply to the BIA’s action in Rosebud.89 
 
restricting use of the area. Id. at 1119–21. The Eighth Circuit stated that section 102(2)(C) 
“indicate[s] that the social and economic effects of proposed agency action must . . . be 
considered once it is determined that the proposed agency action significantly affects the 
physical environment.” Id. at 1125.  
 However, the court also recognized that the outfitters’ own recreational interest in the 
wilderness area was a non-economic interest closely tied to the physical environment. Id. at 
1126. The court held,  
[T]he Outfitters have asserted particular provisions of NEPA which encompass the 
claims they set forth in their complaint. We need not consider whether the Outfitters 
are in fact more concerned with economics than with the welfare of the physical 
environment. Regardless of their true intent, they have standing to ensure that the 
agency adequately considers all of the statutorily referenced concerns when balancing 
the relevant factors in the Final EIS. 
Id. at 1127. 
 Although the grounds for the holding are not spelled out in so many words, the outfitters’ 
recreational interests were presumably sufficient to support their standing. See supra notes 5–6. 
It is unclear whether the discussion of economic interests was dicta or an alternate ground for 
the holding.  
 87. Dombeck, 164 F.3d at 1125.  
Human environment shall be interpreted comprehensively to include the natural and 
physical environment and the relationship of people with that environment. . . . This 
means that economic or social effects are not intended by themselves to require 
preparation of an environmental impact statement. When an environmental impact 
statement is prepared and economic or social and natural or physical environmental 
effects are interrelated, then the environmental impact statement will discuss all of 
these effects on the human environment. 
40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (2006). The Eighth Circuit’s apparent reliance on implementing 
regulations in this context has been the subject of criticism from other circuits. See infra note 
105.  
 88. Dombeck, 164 F.3d at 1126 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331(b)(2) (purpose of NEPA to 
“assure for all Americans . . . productive . . . surroundings”), 4331(b)(5) (purpose of NEPA to 
“achieve a balance . . . which will permit high standards of living”), 4331(a) (purpose of NEPA 
“to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can . . . fulfill the social, 
economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.”), and 40 
C.F.R. §§ 1508.27(a), 1508.8, and 1502.16(a),(b)). 
 89.  Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. McDivitt, 286 F.3d 1031, 1039 (8th Cir. 2002). The court 
relied on Central S.D. Cooperative Grazing Dist. v. Sec’y of the United States Dep’t of Agric., 
266 F.3d 889, 895 (8th Cir. 2001), in reaching this conclusion. Rosebud Sioux, 286 F.3d at 1038 
(“[T]his case is controlled by our very recent holding in Grazing . . .”).  
 In Grazing, an association of ranchers who grazed cattle on federal land challenged a land 
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Outside the EIS context, the Eighth Circuit has not held that any 
NEPA provision requires consideration of economic effects. The 
statement of concern for the “economic . . . requirements of present 
and future generations of Americans”90 in section 101(a) is “merely a 
broad policy statement” which does not provide a basis for 
standing.91 Section 102(2)(E) does not reference the human 
environment or economic interests, and thus cannot support the 
standing of a plaintiff with purely economic interests.92  
In sum, the Eighth Circuit rule distinguishes between challenges 
to non-preparation of an EIS (threshold applicability cases) and 
challenges to the adequacy of an existing EIS.93 Standing to challenge 
the non-preparation of an EIS requires an environmental injury.94 
Standing to challenge the adequacy of an EIS, on the other hand, may 
be supported by an economic injury.95  
 
management plan reducing the number of grazing animals permitted. Id. at 892–94. The 
agencies responsible had prepared an EA and a FONSI for the plan. Id. Addressing the 
association’s standing, the Court stated the rule that an organizational plaintiff can only assert 
interests germane to its purpose. Id. at 896–97 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)). Because the grazing district did not 
show that its interests were in any way environmental, it could not assert environmental 
interests even if they were present. Id.  
 The Eighth Circuit considered and rejected three NEPA provisions proffered by the 
plaintiffs as a basis for standing. Id. at 895. It held that section 101(a) was merely a broad 
policy statement that did not support standing. Id. at 896. Section 102(2)(C), the EIS 
requirement, did not apply because no EIS had been prepared. Id. at 895. Section 102(2)(E) did 
apply, but did not require consideration of economic interests, the only interests the association 
was able to assert. Id. at 896. The court concluded, “[I]f its interests are only economic, the 
Grazing District is not within the zone of interests of the provision under which it has asserted 
its claim and thereby lacks prudential standing.” Id. at 896–97.  
 90. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2000).  
 91. Rosebud Sioux, 286 F.3d at 1039 (citing Central S.D. Coop. Grazing Dist. v. Sec’y of 
the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 266 F.3d 889, 896 (8th Cir. 2001)). 
 92. Id. (relying on Grazing, 266 F.3d at 896). The court has stated that section 102(2)(E) 
“does not specifically consider the human environment. . . . Based on the statutory structure and 
language, the manifest purpose of section [102(2)(E)] is to require federal agencies to consider 
environmentally sound alternatives to proposed actions without reference to the human 
environment and, thus, to economic interests.” Grazing, 266 F.3d at 896.  
 93.  Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115, 1127 (8th 
Cir. 1999) (“in the present case, the threshold applicability of NEPA is not contested”); Cent. 
Grazing, 266 F.3d at 896 (“In this matter . . . no EIS was prepared, which is of central import to 
[§ 102(2)(C)] and to Dombeck.”).  
 94.  Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. McDivitt, 286 F.3d 1031, 1039 (8th Cir. 2002). See supra 
notes 91–94 and accompanying text for discussion of this rule.  
 95.  Rosebud Sioux, 286 F.3d at 1038–39. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text 
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B. The Ninth Circuit: A Purely Economic Injury is not Within 
NEPA’s Zone of Interests 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Eighth Circuit rule in Ashley Creek 
Phosphate Co. v. Norton.96 In that case, a producer of phosphate 
challenged a Bureau of Land Management decision allowing another 
company to open a phosphate mine on government land.97 The 
producer alleged that the EIS for the project did not consider that it 
could produce the phosphate, a lower-impact alternative to its 
competitor’s mining.98 The court found that the plaintiff lacked 
constitutional standing, but proceeded to consider prudential standing 
as an alternative basis for its decision.99  
The Ninth Circuit directly criticized the Eighth Circuit’s 
“bifurcated reading”100 of section 102(2)(C), on which the producer 
relied.101 First, the court argued that section 102(2)(C) “does not set 
out a purely economic factor, unconnected to environmental 
concerns.”102 Second, it pointed out Supreme Court precedent 
identifying NEPA as a statute that protects the environment.103 Third, 
the Ninth Circuit challenged the Eighth Circuit’s reliance on the 
regulatory definition of “human environment” to support its 
interpretation of section 102(2)(C).104 The court questioned whether 
 
for discussion of this rule.  
 96. 420 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2005).  
 97. Id. at 936–37.  
 98. Id. at 937–38 (referring to the requirement in NEPA section 102(2)(C)(iii), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(2)(C)(iii) (2000) that every EIS consider alternatives to the proposed action).  
 99. Id. at 937–39. 
 100. Id. at 941.  
 101. Id. at 940–42.  
 102. Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934, 940–42 (9th cir. 2005). The 
court observed that “the human environment is the overarching principle driving [section 
102(2)(C)].” Id. at 943. It considered the statutory requirements for an EIS and found them 
“infused with environmental considerations, leaving no room for economic interests divorced 
from the environment.” Id. Finally, it argued that the word ‘productivity’ in subsection (iv) 
“does not require a discussion of the impacts on productivity that are not intertwined with the 
environment.” Id.  
 103. Id. at 943 (citing Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 
U.S. 139, 143 (1981); Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350 (1979); and Metro. Edison Co. 
v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983)). Metropolitan Edison is discussed 
supra at note 63.  
 104. Ashley Creek, 420 F.3d at 943–44 (referring to Friends of the Boundary Waters 
Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115, 1125–26 (8th Cir. 1999); see also supra note 87 and 
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such reliance was appropriate,105 adopting the position that “courts 
should not use regulations to expand the zone of interests beyond 
what Congress intended.”106 The Ninth Circuit then examined the 
regulation and concluded that “to the extent regulations clarify 
section 102(2)(C)’s zone of interests, they demonstrate that purely 
economic considerations are not within that zone.”107  
Finally, the court provided an alternative application of Bennett v. 
Spear to NEPA. It distinguished between NEPA and ESA, arguing 
that the ESA provision at issue in Bennett “establishes specific 
normative requirements, [while] each section of NEPA is a purely 
procedural one that furthers the general purpose of the statute.”108 It 
concluded, on this basis, that the purpose of NEPA and the purpose 
of section 102(2)(C) are “one and the same: protection of the 
environment.”109 
 
accompanying text.  
 105. Ashley Creek, 420 F.3d at 943 n.4. The Ninth Circuit cited and drew from Town of 
Stratford v. Federal Aviation Administration, 285 F.3d 84, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2002), in its treatment 
of this point. Ashley Creek, 420 F.3d at 943 n.4 (2005). Stratford directly criticized Dombeck, 
stating, “we do not see how any agency regulation implementing a statute could extend 
prudential standing beyond the class of persons Congress intends, but, in any event, we do not 
read the CEQ regulations as purporting to extend prudential standing.” Stratford, 285 F.3d at 
89.  
 106. Ashley Creek, 420 F.3d at 943 n.4 (2005).  
 107. Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934, 944 (9th Cir. 2005). “Although 
[the regulatory definition of ‘human environment’] indicates that economic considerations may 
be relevant, those economic effects matter only when they are ‘interrelated’ with ‘natural or 
physical environmental effects.’” Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14) (emphasis omitted).  
 108. Id. at 944. 
 109. Id. at 945 (quoting Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. Cartwright, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 
1109 (D. Ariz. 1998)).  
The overall purpose of NEPA is to declare a national commitment to protecting and 
promoting environmental quality. Each of NEPA’s various procedural provisions is 
designed to further that goal of environmental protection. . . . Because the individual 
procedural provisions, including section 102(2)(C), are intended to further the 
overarching goal of NEPA, to safeguard the environment, the provisions cannot be 
divorced from that broader purpose. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 The Ninth Circuit rests this conclusion on the Supreme Court’s decision in Robertson v. 
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348, 350–51 (1989). Ashley Creek, 420 F.3d at 
944–45. The Ninth Circuit initially cites Methow Valley for its contrast of NEPA’s procedural 
requirements with the Endangered Species Act’s substantive requirements. Id. at 944 (citing 
Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 350–51). It then cites Methow Valley for its statement that NEPA’s 
EIS requirement is an “action-forcing procedure” meant “to ensure that the commitment to 
environmental protection is infused into the federal government’s actions.” Id. at 945 (citing 
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III. WHAT IS NEPA’S ZONE OF INTEREST? 
A. Bennett v. Spear and NEPA 
The Ninth Circuit’s reading of NEPA in Ashley Creek is 
unpersuasive:  
In contrast to the [Endangered Species Act], under which the 
substantive goals of an individual provision may have a more 
specific objective than the overarching goal of the statute and 
may be analyzed independently, section 102 of NEPA cannot 
be separated from the statute’s overarching purpose of 
environmental protection because it is designed to further that 
purpose[.]110.  
Bennett v. Spear’s holding, that even though section 7 of the ESA is 
designed to further the statute’s overarching purpose of species 
preservation, it also aims to prevent needless economic dislocation,111 
 
Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 348). Finally, the Ninth Circuit quotes a statement from Methow 
Valley that the action-forcing procedures of NEPA enable its sweeping policy goals to be 
realized. Id. (citing Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 350). While these references accurately present 
the holdings of Methow Valley, they seem not to be entirely on point. Infra note 111 gives one 
possible explanation for this puzzling aspect of an otherwise sound opinion.  
 110. Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934, 944–45 (9th Cir. 2005).  
 111. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 176–77 (1997) (implying that a statutory provision 
may have more than one purpose and, thus, more than one zone of interests). See supra notes 
64–73 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bennett.  
 The Ninth Circuit’s curious reliance on Methow Valley in Ashley Creek, see supra note 
109, may be due to a misreading of Bennett on this point. While the Ninth Circuit correctly 
identifies the holding of Bennett “that one objective of [ESA] section 7 was to avoid ‘needless 
economic dislocation’”, Ashley Creek at 941 (quoting Bennett, 520 U.S. at 176–77), it does not 
anywhere state or indicate awareness that a statutory provision may have more than one 
purpose. In discussing Bennett, the Ninth Circuit states that “the specific purpose of section 7 of 
the ESA” is “preventing economic dislocation” and that this purpose is “different from” the 
general purpose of ESA in preserving endangered species. Id. at 944 (citing Bennett, 520 U.S. 
at 176–77). However, Bennett does not identify the prevention of needless economic dislocation 
as the purpose of section 7. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 176–77. Rather, it states that “while 
[section 7] no doubt serves to advance the ESA’s overall goal of species preservation, we think 
it readily apparent that another objective (if not indeed the primary one) is to avoid needless 
economic dislocation.” Id. (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit’s emphasis on “the specific 
purpose” of the statutory provision contrasts with the Supreme Court’s language indicating 
multiple purposes.  
 If the Ninth Circuit failed to appreciate the full holding of Bennett, that a statutory 
provision may have more than one purpose and, thus, more than one zone of interests, this 
could help explain its practically exclusive reliance on Methow. See infra note 110 and 
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counters the Ninth Circuit’s position. It is thus apparent that section 
102(2)(C) may further any number of purposes, both economic and 
environmental. The question of which purposes it promotes depends 
on congressional intent.112  
B. Congressional Intent: The Purpose(s) of NEPA 
The overarching purpose of NEPA is clearly articulated in section 
101.113 Section 101 exhibits concern for economic goals and values, 
but this concern is presented through the lens of the environment.114 
Stated another way, the purpose of the act is to protect the 
environment so that economic goals and other goals can be 
fulfilled.115 While section 101 reflects appreciation of economic 
factors, environmental concerns are the clear focus of the statute.  
Of course, Bennett shows that the overarching purpose of a statute 
may be distinct from the purposes of its individual provisions.116 The 
initial clause of section 102(2)(C) requires an EIS whenever there is a 
significant impact on the “human environment.”117 The statute does 
not define “human environment.” Therefore, construction of the term 
falls to common usage.118 Most simply, “human environment” means 
 
accompanying text. Adopting the flawed interpretation of Bennett suggested above, if Methow 
Valley says that section 102(2)(C) serves an environmental purpose, then the Eighth Circuit 
must be wrong to say that it serves any other purpose. If a particular statutory provisions can 
have at most one purpose, the Supreme Court in Methow Valley trumps the Eighth Circuit’s 
reading. In the context of this flawed interpretation of Bennett, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on 
Methow Valley makes sense.  
 112. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156 (1970) (looking to 
statutory text to identify zone of interests).  
 113. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2000).  
 114. Id., see supra note 95.  
 115. In other words, the economic and other interests alluded to in section 101 are NEPA’s 
ultimate ends, with its environmental requirements the means to those ends. See Metro. Edison 
Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 772–73 (1983) (“Although NEPA states 
its goals in sweeping terms of human health and welfare, these goals are ends that Congress has 
chosen to pursue by means of protecting the physical environment.”). 
 116. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 176–77 (1997) (discussed supra at text accompanying 
notes 64–74).  
 117. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000).  
 118. Although the CEQ regulations define “human environment”, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 
(2005), use of the regulations to discern congressional intent has been questioned. See supra 
note 107 and accompanying text. Because Bennett focuses on congressional intent, 520 U.S. at 
176–77, and especially because the CEQ regulations interpreting NEPA were never authorized 
or endorsed by Congress, see infra note 124, this section focuses on the statute in isolation from 
Washington University Open Scholarship










208 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 25:189 
 
 
“the environment of humans” or “the surroundings we live in.”119 
Congress defined the set of situations in which an EIS is required, 
and it makes sense that they would impose this burden only when 
environmental interests are at stake.120 On this point, the intent of the 
Congress seems clear: a plaintiff must assert an environmental 
interest in order to have standing to challenge non-preparation of an 
EIS.  
Section 102(2)(C)(iv) requires every EIS to cover “the 
relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and 
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity.”121 The 
mention of “productivity” suggests an economic consideration, since 
productivity is a measure of economic output per unit of input. On 
the other hand, the placement of “productivity” within the clause 
links it to “man’s environment,” suggesting that productivity here 
refers to an environmental value.122 Recalling the means-ends relation 
of environmental and economic goals of section 101,123 it appears 
that section 102(2)(C)(iv) refers to the tradeoffs involved in making 
decisions about the allocations of resources.124 Other features of 
section 102(2)(C) support this observation: subsection (iii) requires 
inclusion of alternatives to the proposed action; subsection (iv) refers 
 
its implementing regulations.  
 119. Compare National Environmental Policy Act § 102(2)(C)(iv), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(2)(C)(iv) (2000) (“man’s environment”) with id. § 102(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) 
(“human environment”).  
 120. Considering the required content of an EIS, it does not appear that one would be of 
much use unless some environmental value were at stake. Id. § 102(2)(C)(i), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(2)(C)(i), (“environmental impact”); § 102(2)(C)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(ii) 
(unavoidable “adverse economic effects”); § 102(2)(C)(iv), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iv) 
(tradeoffs between short-term and long-term uses of “man’s environment”); § 102(2)(C)(v), 42 
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(v) (irreversible commitments of resources).  
 121. Section § 102(2)(C)(iv), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)(iv). 
 122. Id.  
 123. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.  
 124. Indeed, it is apparent throughout the statute that Congress does not recognize a bright 
line distinction between economic and environmental values. NEPA seems to have been 
motivated by the idea that in order for economic prosperity to be sustainable over the long term, 
environmental values must be honored. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
§ 102(2)(C)(iv), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iv); see also Chairman Barton, Aiming at the Target: 
Achieving the Objects of Sustainable Development in Agency Decision-Making, 13 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 837, 881–82 (2001) (“If one studies the goals and principles encapsulated 
within Section 101 of NEPA, the notions of intergenerational equity and sustainable 
development are clearly apparent.”).  
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to “uses,” implying consideration of multiple purposes; and 
subsection (v) requires a discussion of permanent resource 
commitments.125 These textual features indicate that Congress 
intended economic values related to local, short-term consumption of 
resources to be considered alongside environmental values related to 
sustainable long-term uses.  
This is not to say, however, that the Eighth Circuit interpretation 
is the correct interpretation, that all economic interests are sufficient 
to confer standing to challenge the sufficiency of an EIS which has 
already been prepared.126 Agency actions may affect economic 
interests that are not related to weighing local short-term economic 
benefits against the benefits of a more sustainable policy. Economic 
interests unrelated to the environment are outside the zone of interests 
of NEPA and do not support standing.127  
For example, the plaintiff mining company in Ashley Creek was 
interested in neither the immediate short-term use of the resource in 
question, the government land, nor the preservation of that 
resource.128 The company’s purpose was to procure business for itself 
by obstructing a competing business.129 The harm caused by the 
alleged NEPA violation, loss of a business opportunity, was not tied 
to aesthetic values or use of natural resources. The decision in Ashley 
Creek was therefore correct.  
In contrast, a professional guide’s interest in the use of a certain 
wilderness area, although economic, is directly related to the 
environment.130 The guide derives his livelihood from the use of 
environmental resources. NEPA’s concern for competing uses and 
commitments of resources requires consideration of these interests in 
the EIS. A professional guide or outfitter with these interests should 
be permitted to enforce the EIS requirement.131  
 
 125. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 
 126. See supra text accompanying notes 85–89 for discussion of this Eighth Circuit rule.  
 127. Cf. Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 773–74; text 
accompanying supra note 63.  
 128. Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934, 936 (9th Cir. 2005).  
 129. Id. at 939 (“Ashley Creek’s interest in the EIS analysis is purely financial.”).  
 130. C.f. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115, 1125 (8th Cir. 1999).  
 131. This example ignores the likelihood that a plaintiff in this situation would assert loss 
of aesthetic enjoyment and recreational opportunities instead of, or in addition to, economic 
injuries. See Dombeck, 164 F.3d at 1126. These injuries would be sufficient to confer standing 
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This approach, which appears to be the correct application of the 
zone of interests test to section 102(2)(C), based on the text of that 
statute, is captured by one statement of the Ninth Circuit:  
. . . [Section 102(2)(C)(iv)] requires a statement, not of all 
economic interests, but rather of the relationship between uses 
of the environment and productivity. It does not require a 
discussion of the impacts on productivity that are not 
intertwined with the environment. In short, nothing in the text 
of [the EIS requirement] suggests that an EIS must address an 
economic concern that is not tethered to the environment.132 
In sum, economic interests “tethered to” or “intertwined with” the 
environment, such as those connected with aesthetic values or the use 
of natural resources are within the zone of interests implicated by 
section 102(2)(C). Therefore, those economic interests should 
support standing to challenge an EIS.133  
C. Public Policy: Who Should Have Standing? 
Even if the rule set out in the previous section is the correct 
application of the current standing doctrine to the current NEPA 
statute, it is susceptible to policy arguments.134 Congress has the 
power to modify the rules of prudential standing, and it has the power 
to modify NEPA.135 If a different rule would better serve the interests 
of the public, then Congress should move to adopt it.136  
 
under NEPA. Id.  
 132. Ashley Creek, 420 F.3d at 943.  
 133. C.f. Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 773–74 
(1983). Note that while this conclusion adopts language from Ashley Creek, the reasoning 
behind it differs in several respects from that of the Ninth Circuit.  
 134. This section does not attempt to address all normative critiques of standing doctrine. 
See supra notes 9, 47 (citing critiques outside the scope of this Note). It only addresses 
concerns of public policy within the scope of this Note: those related to the ability of economic 
interest plaintiffs to challenge an EIS, and the bar to economic interest plaintiffs challenging 
non-preparation of an EIS. 
 135. See supra note 50.  
 136. A congressional task force has recommended changes to NEPA, and to NEPA 
standing in particular. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 26–27:  
Recommendation 4.1: Ammend NEPA to create a citizen suit provision. . . . This 
provision would clarify the standards and procedures for judicial review of NEPA 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/10
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One policy concern raised by the current rule is the ability of 
affected parties to participate in the NEPA process and to challenge 
results unfavorable to them.137 Under current NEPA standing 
doctrine, non-environmental economic interest parties cannot 
challenge non-preparation of an EIS.138 This might be considered a 
fault of the current doctrine, and a justification for expanding the 
scope of NEPA. However, NEPA is not concerned with the interests 
of such parties.139 There are statutes other than NEPA that require 
agencies to consider certain economic effects of their actions.140 If 
Congress wanted to expand the ability of economic interest parties to 
challenge agency actions, it would be more sensible to enact an 
appropriate economic policy act than to amend NEPA and distort its 
purpose.141  
The other countervailing policy concern is the avoidance of undue 
interference with agency action. Agencies are constrained to comply 
with NEPA before taking any action with significant environmental 
effects.142 When this mandatory compliance takes the form of an EIS, 
costly delays and lost opportunities may result.143 To some extent, 
 
actions. If implemented, the citizen suit provision would . . . [e]stablish clear 
guidelines on who has standing to challenge an agency decision. These guidelines 
should take into account factors such as the challenger’s relationship to the proposed 
federal action, the extent to which the challenger is directly impacted by the action, 
and whether the challenger was engaged in the NEPA process prior to filing the 
challenge[.]  
Id.  
 137. One justification for the APA suit provision, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000), is that agencies 
may choose to ignore injured parties that cannot enforce their rights in court.  
 138. Put another way, current NEPA standing doctrine bars economic interest plaintiffs 
from challenging an agency’s choice of the FONSI route to NEPA compliance. 
 139. See supra notes 123–27 and accompanying text. 
 140. See, e.g., Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–12 (2000) (mandating 
procedures similar to those of NEPA considering impacts of regulations on small businesses).  
 141. This is not meant to recommend adoption of any such economic policy act, but merely 
to advocate against amending NEPA to serve economic purposes. Before adopting such a law, 
the Congress would do well to carefully weigh the countervailing interests to such an act, of 
which the efficiency of agency decisionmaking is only the most relevant to the focus of this 
Note. See infra notes 148–49 and accompanying text.  
 142. See supra Part I.A. 
 143. An agency may delay approving a license for a private business enterprise, for 
example, so that it will have time to prepare an EIS. This delay might cause investors to 
withdraw support or lead to a host of other potential problems. Alternately, a delay in a public 
construction project might drastically increase the cost of the project to taxpayers.  
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this is an unavoidable consequence of NEPA generally and is not tied 
to rules about standing. However, if more liberal standing rules were 
adopted, the number of lawsuits filed would presumably rise, as 
would the costs of litigation to agencies.144 In response, agencies 
would be likely to approach the EIS process with more caution, either 
including reams of unnecessary documents and analyses in a 
misguided effort to survive review,145 or avoiding it through overuse 
of FONSIs. Neither approach would efficiently and effectively 
advance the goals of NEPA. Thus, an ideal rule would provide 
appropriate opportunities for private parties to assert their interests 
while, at the same time, minimally hampering the ability of agencies 
to make timely decisions.  
One approach would deny standing to all parties with an 
economic, rather than purely environmental, interest. While it is 
certainly important not to apply NEPA so that it unreasonably 
interferes with agency processes, it is not clear that such a rule would 
substantially accomplish this goal. Economic interest plaintiffs 
appear to bring only a small number of NEPA cases, and so it does 
not seem that their presence greatly increases either incidence, 
expense, or agency fear of NEPA litigation.146 Furthermore, standing 
is no guarantee of a hearing on the merits, as some portion of 
economic interest cases are already dispatched relatively 
inexpensively on motions to dismiss. It is thus unclear whether 
agency operations would be made substantially more efficient by 
denying all economic interest plaintiffs standing.  
More importantly, there are better ways to limit NEPA’s negative 
effects on agency efficiency. One proposal is firm time limits on the 
 
 144. Because fewer cases would be dismissed for lack of standing, more cases would 
presumably go to trial, and litigation costs would increase significantly.  
 145. See CEQ STUDY, supra note 27, at 19–20.  
 146. The circuit split on standing of economic interest plaintiffs did not clearly emerge 
until Ashley Creek in 420 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2005), nearly 35 years after the enactment of 
NEPA. In the meantime, NEPA standing has been litigated in dozens of reported cases. 
Annotation, General Principles Governing Standing to Maintain Action Challenging Omission 
or Adequacy of Environmental Impact Statement Required by § 102(2)(c) of National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(c)), 61 A.L.R. FED. 87 (2005). This 
suggests a fairly low percentage of economic interest plaintiffs.  
 Recall that parties with standing under the current rule are those whose economic interests 
are fairly “intertwined” with the environment rather than those with an unrelated economic 
interest in a particular matter. See supra Part III.B.  
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NEPA process and page limits on NEPA compliance documents.147 If 
aversion to legal liability causes some agencies to irrationally over-
allocate resources to NEPA compliance efforts, this tendency could 
be corrected by externally-imposed limitations. To the extent that 
NEPA compliance efforts are a cause of agency inefficiency, this 
proposal seems a better solution than excluding plaintiffs who 
arguably serve the purpose of NEPA.148  
Another proposal would limit standing to parties who have 
asserted their interests throughout the NEPA process.149 
Opportunities for public comment and participation occur at several 
key junctures in the process.150 If interested parties make use of these 
forums to voice their interests, agencies have the opportunity to 
address these concerns preemptively.151 However, agencies never 
have the opportunity to do this if interested parties opt not to 
participate. Penalizing nonparticipating parties through loss of 
standing to sue would substantially narrow the class of potential 
plaintiffs without arbitrarily eliminating parties based on an abstract 
judgment about the nature of their interests.152  
These two proposals, reining in the excesses of the EIS process 
and making active participation in the NEPA process a prerequisite 
for standing, promote efficient agency decisionmaking, as well as the 
goals of NEPA. These proposals and others that do not arbitrarily 
exclude interested parties should be explored before a more 
restrictive standing rule is considered.  
 
 147. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 25 (recommending an amendment of NEPA to 
limit EIS process to eighteen months and EA process to nine months); id. at 26 (recommending 
a 300 page limit for EIS’s).  
 148. Drafting the type of rule described in this paragraph might prove difficult, because an 
exception to the page limit might occasionally be warranted for complex projects. However, 
allowing any exception would be dangerous, because the current exception for “extraordinary 
circumstances” has swallowed the rule. See id.  
 149. Id. at 26–27, see also supra Part I.A. 
 150. See MANDELKER, supra note 21 (describing the EIS process).  
 151. In Ocean Advocates v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 402 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 
2005), discussed supra at note 45, the court noted the participation of advocacy groups 
throughout the process.  
 152. Of course, adequate notice to the interested parties of their opportunity to participate 
in the process would be essential to the fairness of such a system.  
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IV. CONCLUSION  
NEPA’s EIS provision is a considerable safeguard against short-
sighted agency actions that ignore significant environmental 
consequences. NEPA enforcement suits by private parties make 
agency decisionmaking less efficient, but have the valuable upside of 
promoting NEPA compliance. Prudential standing is one way the 
federal courts safeguard against frivolous lawsuits, and the zone of 
interests test in particular gives effect to congressional purpose. A 
close reading of NEPA reveals that its zone of interests encompasses 
economic considerations that bear a substantial relationship to the 
environment, and excludes all other economic interests. This rule 
makes sense in the context of current standing doctrines, and it does 
not appear that its modification would substantially further NEPA 
purposes. This is particularly true in light of more promising and less 
arbitrary proposals for improving NEPA standing requirements.  
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